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Dynamic Gains and Market Access Insurance: 








We use a dynamic computable general equilibrium model to revisit the dynamic benefits 
of the Australia-USA Free Trade Agreement and, in particular, to evaluate the insurance 
value of this agreement in the face of regional and global trade wars. The insurance 
benefits are quantified by comparing the status quo against alternative scenarios where 
some or all regions raise tariffs by 10 percent, both permanently and temporarily. These 
insurance gains are found to be as much as four times larger than the traditional status 
quo efficiency gains. 
 
JEL Classification: F15 




There are a number of papers in the literature evaluating the economic 
consequences of the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA). Important 
contributions include Brown et. al (2005), the Center for International Economics (2004), 
Dee (2004), Findlay (2004), and Siriwardana (2006). Many of these are model based and 
for the most part have focused on the welfare gains, both static and dynamic, that the FTA 
might lead to. In this paper we extend this literature in one important dimension – a 
dynamic analysis of the potential insurance benefits of the agreement.  
 
Trade agreements have many purposes, but one important issue, especially for 
smaller open economies such as Australia, is the ability of such agreements to reduce 
economic harm which might result in the face of adverse external developments in the 
world trading environment. Specifically, in the case of the AUSFTA, would the existence 
of a credible and binding FTA with the US limit economic damage to Australia in the face 
of alternative counterfactuals including either a global trade war of varying duration or one 
specifically with the US? As emphasized by Whalley and Perroni (2000) regional trading 
agreements are often entered into on the part of the smaller partner for precisely these 
reasons. In these circumstances the standard static efficiency gains measured relative to an 
historical base case which is relatively problem free may not be the only appropriate basis 
for comparison. Clearly much of the value of such an agreement is not in its reduction of 
existing trade barriers but rather promises to refrain from imposing barriers in the future. 
For example Phillippa Dee commenting on the US commitments on services in the 
agreement states 
 
“The above promises to abstain from trade barriers do not necessarily 
imply that there are significant barriers present in these areas to start with. 
In most cases, there would not be. This is consistent with the Government’s 
claim that the major achievements for Australia in the chapters on 
investment and cross-border trade are the promises by the United States not 
to initiate new discriminatory measures, rather than to roll back any 
existing  measures.”         Dee (2004), p.90. 
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  In this paper we attempt to quantify these “insurance gains” using a dynamic 
general equilibrium model in which factor accumulation plays a central role. The model 
explicitly treats foresighted investment in three types of physical capital, as well as 
human capital, as the primary drivers of both long term growth and comparative 
advantage, as is familiar from dynamic Hecksher-Ohlin trade theory. When looking at the 
insurance value of an FTA the dynamics become central to the analysis for two reasons. 
First the duration of any trade conflict will impact importantly on the quantified effects as 
the anticipation of both the beginning and end of a ‘trade war’ will affect investment 
decisions. Second trade wars can trigger fairly large terms of trade effects which in turn 
can impact on capital rental prices through the traditional Stolper-Samuelson link. These 
shifts in relative rental prices in teurn impact on endogenous decisions to invest. 
 
  The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 a basic outline of the model, 
theoretical framework and calibration is given. In section 3 the model is used in the 
conventional way to evaluate the welfare gains from both a static and dynamic 
perspective. The calibration here is such that the dynamic productivity effects are as close 
as possible to those used in the influential CIE (2004) report on the AUSFTA. Sections 4 
and 5 carry out an analysis of the insurance benefits of the agreement. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. The Model and Calibration Framework 
The model used in this paper have two specific ‘third generation’ CGE models 
which incorporate dynamic factor accumulation effects. As in the case of G-Cubed model 
(McKibbon and Wilcoxin 1998), which was used in the CIE (2004) study, an explicit 
long run rational expectations view of the process of physical investment and inter-
temporal consumption choices, consistent for example with virtually all of the work in 
modern business cycle and growth theory is used. At a point in time, however, the model 
is Heckscher-Ohlin like. Factors of production are mobile between industries. There are 
three types of physical capital (structures, machinery and equipment, residential capital). 
The second dynamic feature is an inter-temporal optimizing treatment of education and 
human capital. Labor is divided into a skilled and non-skilled category and the relative 
supplies of these change over time as individuals choose to become educated based on 4 
the cost of education, and their forward looking view on the returns to becoming skilled.
1 
An important issue in the dynamic response of investment to a trade policy shock is the 
potential interaction with the endogenous response of human capital. We follow the 
tradition of the trade and wages debate as treating capital and skill as complements within 
production. Thus an increase in supply of human capital will, ceteris paribus, increase the 
demand for physical capital, (Krusell et al 2000). 
 
We think that adding human capital to the analysis is important for two reasons. 
First the quantity of human capital in the economy is large. By most estimates the income 
share of human capital accounts for about one-third of national income. Thus changes in 
the supply of human capital, if they should occur, are likely to be important 
quantitatively. In the case of the AUSFTA much of the debate thus far has been on the 
consequence of the capital accumulation effects that result from the liberalization of 
services and investment provisions. Will such capital accumulation tend to raise or lower 
the level of human capital in the economy? Or alternatively will the Human capital 
response to AUSFTA itself tend to induce significant capital accumulation effects?  
 
The model has three regions – Australia, United States and Rest–of–World 
(ROW). Trade occurs in six traded goods – agriculture, minerals (including energy), low-
tech manufactures, intermediate manufactures, durable goods and traded services. There 
are five non-traded goods – non-traded services, construction, public services, housing 
services, and education. All industries are constant returns competitive sectors including 
education.  
 
Unlike many of the other CGE models used to look at the FTA we do not use the 
Armington assumption on preferences which assumes that goods of different national 
origin enter utility functions as imperfect substitutes. This assumption has the well known 
consequence that terms of trade effects tend to dominate other factors in the ultimate 
welfare effect of any change in trade policy, (Brown 1987, Zhang 2006). The model used 
here rather uses a CET type specification in which goods are differentiated on the supply 
                                                 
1 Within a Hecksher-Ohlin type model changes in the relative supplies of factor endowments has traditional 
consequences for the pattern of trade.  Potentially the long run pattern of trade may differ from the short 
run due to changes induced in relative factor endowments by a policy change.  This carries with it the 
important implication that impact effects of changes in trade policy may be quite different than the longer 
run effect in terms of the sectoral and distributional impact of the policy. 5 
side. Thus ‘cars’ produced in Australia have a different marginal cost of supply 
depending on whether they are delivered to the domestic or foreign markets.   
 
This type of assumption has much in common with the ‘cost of trade’ literature 
which emphasizes that there are costs (transportation, distribution, information) that make 
exporting an activity differentiated from supplying the domestic market. It allows for 
two-way trade and gets much closer to a small open economy framework. In the case of 
Australia for example it is a ‘price-taker’ in the sense that the price of Australian exports 
to the US are largely determined in the US market which sets that price.  
 
Terms of trade effects are not completely absent however and usually come on the 
supply side. A cut in an Australian tariff for example on a US supplied import will cause 
an increase in the supply of imports from the US to Australia. It is possible this could 
raise the marginal cost of the US supply to Australia which would tend to deteriorate 
Australia’s terms of trade. Conversely a US tariff cut on Australian imports into the US 
market could improve the Australian producers’ price and improve the Australian terms 
of trade. These effects hinge not on demand substitution parameters but on the relevant 
elasticities of export supply.
2  
  
Aside from the trade side of the model outlined above factor dynamics are driven by 
income maximizing capital stock owners facing quadratic adjustment costs. Consumption 
and debt dynamics come from a standard inter-temporal utility maximizing framework. 
Both the US and Australia face a world economy growing at a constant rate with a 
constant real interest rate and supply prices of tradable goods. The model is calibrated to 
a year 2000 benchmark using primarily data from GTAP, aggregated to 11 sectors which 
include an education sector which produces skilled workers as an output. The 
interpretation these skilled workers is based on the occupational definitions used in 
GTAP, but it is assumed in addition that skilled workers have four year post school 
education.
3 The GTAP data is also scaled using Penn World Tables 5.6 data so that 
income in each region is expressed in terms of $PPP. Data on industry value added is 
scaled to be consistent with investment spending data in a steady state. Likewise trade 
                                                 
2 The full set of equations describing the model are available from the authors as an appendix. 
3 For details of the construction of this data see Liu (1998). 6 
flow data is scaled so that the benchmark represents a hypothetical steady state with 
balanced trade.  
 
3. A status-quo comparison of the FTA. 
In this section we do a conventional status quo comparison of the AUSFTA 
similar to that of other modelers –see in particular CIE (2004) and Dee (2004). The status 
quo is a steady state world growth path based on data averaged over the late 1990’s and 
early 2000-2002 period. The model is fairly aggregated on the goods side so that it is not 
capable of providing detailed trade creation and trade diversion results. But it is, by the 
standards of most models, quite detailed on the factor side. Moreover because of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin trade structure it provides a quite differential theoretical perspective 
than that of GTAP models where trade patterns are largely determined by assumed 
demand share and substitution parameters.  
 
We will examine the three basic sources of gains discussed in the CIE report—
gains to trade barrier elimination, productivity gains, and investment liberalization gains. 
Despite the different theoretical structure of the model the results are quite similar to the 
CIE projections. By and large, as noted by Lloyd and MacLaren (2004) the estimated 
economic gains to Australia from AUSFTA are quite modest compared to a historical 
benchmark based on the status quo. This is hardly surprising to trade policy analysts. The 
US accounts for about 20 percent of Australia’s trade and the tariff cuts by both countries 
are quite modest under the agreement.  
3.1 Tariff cut effects 
In Tables 1 and 2 the basic effects of the bilateral tariff reduction are reported 
measured relative to a ‘status quo’ baseline. The effects are quite modest in line with 
most other models predictions. The steady state gains in real GDP per capita are 
approximately 0.2 percent and in real consumption per capital even more modest at 0.04 
percent. The gains come slowly with about half arriving after 10 years from the start 
implementation. Recall some tariff cuts in the FTA are phased in quite slowly. There are 
some modest long run effects on factor accumulation. The skilled to unskilled labor ratio 
rises by 0.15 percent and machinery per unskilled worker rises by 0.38 percent. Trade 7 
volumes between Australia and the US rise quite quickly by about 5 percent and increase 
only modestly thereafter peaking at a 6 percent increase. Australia’s trade with the Rest-
of-World (ROW) declines on impact by 0.18 percent and in the long run is hardly 
changed. As noted whether there are trade diversion effects is difficult to assess in a 
model with this degree of aggregation on the goods side.  
 
Overall the results are entirely consistent with most the modeling done on RTA’s 
in the several last years using GTAP-Armington type CGE models as surveyed by Lloyd 
and MacLaren (2004), and the quantitative effect is about in line with those type of 
studies. The long and short run sectoral output effects detailed in Table 2 are very modest 
as well with all long run changes being less than 1.0 percent in absolute value. The 
largest effect is on the durables sector which declines by 1.0 percent on impact. 
 
3.2 Dynamic Gains 
The model-based debate within Australia has focused on two sources of ‘dynamic 
gains’—long run productivity gains as measured by changes in total factor productivity 
(TFP) levels, and increased investment due to investment liberalization which comes 
from a lower cost of capital. We follow as closely as possible the method used by the 
CIE  (2004) report in quantifying these two parameters. The subsequent investment 
responses to these changes are endogenous in the model and represent the long run factor 
supply responses to the change policy environment.  
 
Total factor productivity gains are calibrated as follows. We use the CIE (2004) 
baseline approximation of an assumed 0.3 percent increase in total factor productivity for 
each 1 percent unilateral tariff cut in the tradables sector. With an average tariff level of 5 
percent that translates into a 1.5 percentage increase in total factor productivity. 
Tradables account for 47 percent of total value added so that, for the economy as a whole, 
the TFP gain would be 0.47 times 1.5 percent or 0.71 percent TFP gains on all sectors. 
The most natural interpretation of trade induced productivity gains are those that are 
biased towards capital and human capital which constitutes 69 percent of value added. 
The production structure is modeled such that physical and human capital are nested 
inside a capital ‘aggregate’; thus they are treated as complements with each other but 8 
substitutes against land, resources, and unskilled labour.
4 The 0.71 percent total TFP 
shock translates into a biased productivity shock on reproducible and capital and skilled 
labour equal to 0.71/0.69 which equals approximately 1 percent. This number is adjusted 
to reflect the fact US trade with Australia is only about 20 percent of total trade – thus the 
assumed net impact on the capital biased factor augmentation productivity parameter is 
0.2 percent. This is the baseline productivity gain parameter assumed in the simulations.  
 
The CIE (2004) identified as their single largest source of gains the impact of 
‘investment liberalization’ within the agreement which was modeled as a 5 basis point 
reduction in the equity risk premium on all capital investment in Australia. We treat the 
reduction in the cost of capital on investment decisions as equivalent to a reduction in the 
producers rental price of capital on certain types of capital goods.
5 There is an important 
issue, however, as to exactly what types of capital are most likely to be impacted by the 
reduction in the equity risk premium. One argument would be that it applies only to 
business capital. In this case we take as out baseline adjustment an 8 basis point 
adjustment on r applied to only machinery and structures. This is equivalent to a 0.333 
percent reduction in the rental prices on these assets. Alternatively one could argue that 
the investment liberalization effect would impact all investment decisions in the economy 
– including those on human capital. The idea is that the investment provisions in the 
agreement would ‘spillover’ to lower costs of borrowing for human capital acquisition. 
This case is also considered although the justification for this assumption is at best weak. 
 
  The results for the first case of an investment liberalization, applied only to 
investment in machinery and structures – plus a productivity effect which falls as a biased 
factor augmentation shock on durable capital plus skilled labor –  are presented in 
Table 3. Here we can see that the dynamic effects change the overall economic impact 
considerably. There is a 0.93 percent long run increase in real GDP per capita-almost five 
times that for the trade barrier effect alone. These gains show up in the form of higher 
                                                 
4 This is similar to the framework used in Krussel et.al (2000) although in this case applied to each sector 
rather than at the aggregate economy level. 
5 Give the standard formulae linking rentals, depreciation and investment cost we have the relationship 
Rental rate =(cost of capital + depreciation rate) × net price of new investment goods, or  Q r R ) ( δ + = . If 
r=0.05, δ =0.15, and Q = 1, then R initially equals 0.2. A five basis point reduction in r to r =0.0495  is 
equivalent to a reduction in the rental price of 0.333 percent.  For an 8 basis point change it would come out 
to a 0.2 percent decrease in the rental price.  The CIE (2004) apply the 5 basis point adjustment to all 
capital formation as the investment liberalization shock. 9 
real factor prices for both types of labor and land, and resource rents. Rentals on capital 
in the form of rentals on machinery and structures decline in the long run. Rents on the 
residential capital stock barely change. 
 
The long run accumulation effects are much larger in this case as compared with 
the basic ‘tariff cut only’ changes reported in Table 1. Machinery and structures capital 
per unskilled worker rise in the long run by over 2 percent. The skilled to unskilled labor 
ratio rises by 1.3 percent – a fairly significant net skilling effect. The wages of skilled to 
unskilled workers declines slightly in the long run. The dynamic transition is fairly steady 
with about half the long run GDP gains in place by year 10. The long run versus impact 
effect on some sectors is quite different. Durables, intermediate manufactures and low–
tech manufactures all contract on impact but in the long run all these sectors expand. The 
additional capital accumulation triggered by the dynamic drivers leads to a net expansion 
of what might appear, from purely static analysis, to be net losers from the AUSFTA 
agreement.  
 
  The second investment liberalization scenario we considered was a reduction in 
rental cost of capital to all types of capital formation including human capital. However 
in this case we used the 5 basis point adjustment factor similar to what was applied in the 
CIE report. The results were quite similar overall to those discussed above. Long run 
GDP gains were about 0.9 percent with significant accumulation effects. By expanding 
the set of factors to which ‘investment liberalization’ applies leads to a larger overall 
impact. These results are sensitive however to the assumed complementarity of physical 
and human capital. Overall these results confirm that the dynamic effects are very 
sensitive to the presumed productivity and investment liberalization assumptions.  
 
4. The FTA as Insurance: Global and Regional Trade Wars 
Whalley and Peroni  (2000) argue that small country participation in Regional 
Trade Agreements (RTA’s) are motivated to a considerable degree as an insurance 
arrangement against large country protection or to provide guaranteed market access. The 
structure of gains and losses is such that in a static model small countries must offer large 
countries side payments in order to induce them to participate in the RTA. They use a 10 
static model to evaluate this idea using constrained and unconstrained Nash tariff war 
equilibrium as their point of evaluation. Given the complexity of the dynamic model we 
are not able to model a Nash tariff equilibrium. The model does, however, allow us to 
look at other aspects of the ‘insurance value’ of the FTA related to timing and duration. If 
an RTA is viewed as ‘insurance’ against a trade war, the value of the RTA could differ 
depending upon when the trade war occurs, with whom, and its duration. 
4.1 The value of being Inside a Trade Bloc: Permanent vs. Temporary 
Trade Wars 
Suppose the adverse event against which market access insurance is judged, is the 
prospect of world breaking into permanent trade blocs centered on a few key countries. 
What is the impact on a small country left being left outside versus inside a trade bloc? 
The FTA is treated as a commitment device for governments such that in the event of a 
general trade war the members of the FTA at least do not raise tariffs against each other. 
The insurance value of the FTA is judged relative to the alternative – no FTA and a 
similar global trade war. The basic issue is the extent to which the damage to Australia of 
a larger trade war can be reduced through commitment to the AUSFTA. It is certainly not 
a foregone conclusion that the value of this insurance is very high. The US, for example, 
only accounts for about 20% of Australia’s exports in the baseline. How trade impacts 
with other countries and, in particular, whether the trade is bilateral or global, will impact 
on the perceived ‘insurance’ value of any RTA.  
 
Timing and anticipation of the trade war will also matter. We will consider two 
cases – anticipated permanent trade wars and temporary and unanticipated trade wars. 
For small open economies that are not members of a bloc these anticipation effects will 
drive investment and human capital decisions to some degree. Thus the expectation of 
being out of the bloc in the future will have negative consequences in the present. In 
particular instability can result in an economy simply as a consequence of market 
perception as to the likelihood of a trade war. Joining a bloc, however, may mitigate these 
risks and therefore would avoid the consequences of the trade war anticipation effects.   
 
In order to quantitatively evaluate the potential insurance value to Australia of the 
AUSFTA it is necessary to quantify the impact on Australia in two counterfactual 11 
situations – that of being IN versus being OUT of the US trade block. For modeling 
purposes we standardize the ‘trade war event’ as an increase in tariffs by ten percent from 
their existing levels by all involved parties. In the event that Australia is a member of a 
the US bloc, by virtue of the AUSFTA commitments, neither Australia nor the US raise 
tariffs against each other. From a national interest standpoint a measure of the insurance 
value of the AUSFTA is the reduction in cumulative real GDP losses to Australia from 
avoiding a trade war which is assumed to arise by committing to an FTA arrangement 




On historical grounds the ten percent number is not particularly high, and 
certainly not high relative to Nash optimal tariffs calculated in the literature. While one 
could argue along optimal tariff theory lines it would be unlikely that Australia would 
impose a ten percent tariff on all imports as the optimal retaliatory response. It is also 
unlikely, from a political economy standpoint, that a no-retaliation response would occur. 
Rather “tit-for-tat” retaliation, even by small countries, fits with the historical experience 
of known trade wars. 
4.2 Permanent or Long Lived Trade Wars 
In this section we consider the case of a long-lived or permanent trade war. We 
also assume that the trade war is fully anticipated. Specifically the case examined 
considers a trade war between blocs which begins in year 11 after the agreement is 
signed, or simply in year 11 in the event that the AUSFTA is not implemented. Market 
participants in both the IN and OUT scenarios fully anticipate the trade war and this has 
consequences for factor accumulation. In reality there would obviously be substantial 
uncertainty regarding the exact dates and magnitudes of response in a “tit-for-tat” trade 
war. The fully anticipated case can best be thought of as providing lower bound to the 
possible damage which might result in the unanticipated case, given that the ability of the 
economy to respond in the short run would be more limited. Moreover we do not include 
                                                 
6 McLaren (1997) has argued that static analysis of trade agreements between parties with asymmetric 
economic power are flawed because they do not deal with the ‘sunk cost’ aspect of entering a trade 
agreement.  One in an agreement a lot of investments are made whose value hinges on the presumed 
continuation of the agreement.  This model avoids such a criticism given the use of the perfect foresight 
assumption investment decisions respond rationally to both the anticipation of a trade war starting and to 
one ending.  Over the long run all sunk capital is ultimately malleable. 12 
any dynamic add-on effects due to productivity reductions or increased risk premia on 
investment. While the latter are clearly relevant we have no particular way in which to 
calibrate these possible effects.  
 
To evaluate the insurance value of AUSFTA we first consider a benchmark of 
global trade war with Australia on the outside beginning in year 11 of the simulation. The 
economic consequences of a global trade war for Australia relative to the status quo are, 
unsurprisingly, considerable.
7 Steady state real GDP per capita falls by 4.6 percent and 
real wages fall by an average of about 3.7 percent The openness ratio declines by 23 
percent. The terms of trade tend to improve marginally. There are some negative effects 
on capital. Machinery and structures to GDP ratios fall by 1.6 and 2.8 percent 
respectively.  
 
The global trade war is also significantly de-skilling for Australia; the skilled to 
unskilled labour ratio falls by 3.7 percent. Not surprisingly, relative to the status quo, the 
big losers on a sectoral basis are agriculture and minerals, and all sectors contract with 
the exception of durables and low-tech manufacturing. Note there are also significant 
anticipation effects on capital accumulation – a slowdown in growth and investment 
begins well ahead of the trade war with per capital GDP falling by over 1% relative to the 
base in the year prior to the trade war starting. Also because of the de-skilling effect of 
the trade war, the output of the education sector falls significantly. Education falls by 
over 10% in the year the trade war starts, in anticipation of the reduced demand for 
skilled labour.  
 
For our purposes however the global trade war scenario is primarily relevant 
because it provides a benchmark against which to assess the value of the AUSFTA in 
terms of mitigating the damage of such a trade war. The net impact of Australia being IN 
relative to having no such agreement are detailed in Table 5. From a long run perspective 
the net insurance value of the FTA in these circumstances is distinctly positive and 
provides a much larger impact than the conventional status quo based efficiency gains. 
GDP per capita gains are one percent – this is five times the gains in Table 1, which 
                                                 
7 We do not include a table of these results.  While they are of independent interest they are not directly 
relevant to quantifying the ‘insurance gains’. Tables 5-7 report the value of being inside the US bloc 
relative to alternative cases of being outside the bloc. 13 
reports the FTA against a status quo (no trade war) base case. In the first 5 years the gains 
are relatively modest but build steadily after that. If one simply looks at total 
undiscounted GDP gains by being IN versus OUT the number is very large. Cumulative 
GDP losses from being OUT are 35 percent of base GDP. This is a very significant effect. 
The FTA in this case also serves to reduce some of the substantial deskilling effects of 
the unconstrained trade war. Thus the skilled to unskilled trade ratio is higher by one 
percent than in the case of being OUT. At the sectoral level the insurance benefits are 
generally small and spread across all sectors in the long run. 
 
  We do not report an exhaustive set of parameter sensitivity result here. One 
parameter of particular interest though is the degree of substitution on the supply side 
between different destination markets. To the extent a supplier is more responsive to 
changes in relative prices between different export markets, a global trade war with the 
US market remaining open would imply that Australian exporters would shift from the 
ROW market to the US market. This is in fact what happens. However the sensitivity of 
the insurance benefits of changing the relative supply elasticities is actually very modest. 
Increasing supply elasticities has the implication that the overall cost of the trade war is 
higher, but the insurance value of the FTA does not appear sensitive to the presumed 
relative export supply elasticity.
8 
 
4.3 Temporary and Unanticipated Trade Wars 
Temporary but unanticipated trade wars with a finite duration (say 3 to 6 years) 
have the usual tariff-war type effects—trade volumes are reduced, efficiency losses 
mount and the non-traded sector expands. Depending on the duration of the trade war the 
factor endowment profile could change. For example if capital intensive sectors have had 
to contract the economy might begin to disinvest in certain types of capital. Unlike the 
previous case, however, as the trade war comes to an end markets will anticipate this, and 
investment will take place such as to return the capital structure back to its long run 
value. Temporary trade wars thus induce not only the traditional trade volume and terms 
                                                 
8 Recall supply to different markets is modeled using sector specific CET functions.  Thus the elasticity of 
relative supply with respect to relative export prices is constant.  The parameter value for this elasticity in 
the base range from 1.5 to 3.  In the experiment discussed above all these elasticities were doubled for all 
suppliers in all countries.  14 
of trade effects, but also raise adjustment costs because of ‘double adjustment’ in the 
process of factor accumulation as capital stocks re-adjust to the pre-trade war policy 
environment. 
 
The results are reported for simulations involving temporary trade wars which 
begin in year 1.
9 Because the start date is year 1 this corresponds to an unanticipated 
trade war. The trade war lasts for five years but the ending date is fully anticipated. The 
tariff increases are 10 percent on all traded goods by all trade war participants. The 
quantitative effects of a temporary unanticipated trade war relative to the status quo are 
much less severe than a permanent trade war discussed above. GDP per capita losses to 
Australia are about 2% for the five years and then rapidly diminish thereafter. Trade 
volumes diminish rapidly throughout the trade war but then also recover rapidly. 
 
 Interestingly the trade war actually causes some skilled labor accumulation and 
reduction of unskilled labor supplies relative to ‘no trade war’. The driving factor here 
appears to be a fall in unskilled wages which reduces the opportunity cost of going to 
school, thus increasing the demand for education. For reference purposes note that 
cumulative GDP losses for the five years during which the trade war occurs (measured 
relative to the steady state with no trade wars) is about 10 percent. Now what of the FTA 
as insurance? 
 
  The consequences of Australia membership within the US bloc in the event of a 
temporary (5 year) global trade war are detailed in Table 6. The market access insurance 
gains from being in the US bloc peak at 0.52 percent GDP per capita in the last year of 
the five year trade war. The cumulative GDP gains over the 5 years are 2.33 percent of 
base year GDP.  By year 10, that is five years after the end of the trade war, the value of 
AUSFTA measured by levels effects has diminished considerably as can be seen in the 
last column of the Table, although cumulative GDP losses are permanent and at year 10 
sit at 2.7 percent of GDP. Trade between Australia and the United States is about 30 
percent higher as a consequence of Australia being inside the US bloc than being out. The 
distribution of the insurance benefits of bloc membership are spread across most factors 
with the exception of machinery which appears to lose marginally. 
                                                 
9 Year 1 is based on a 2005 data benchmark. 15 
4.4. Insurance Against Australia directed US Protectionism 
The last case considered is US protectionism targeted at Australia. Certainly one 
purpose of the agreement from the Australian perspective was too prevent future US 
protectionism against Australian exports to the U.S. This insurance benefit can be 
evaluated on stand-alone basis—that is independent of whether there is a larger external 
trade war. Certainly the possibility of a US initiated trade war specifically against 
Australia seems less likely than the scenarios considered above. The US does, however, 
count for about 20 percent of Australia’s exports and therefore putting a number on 
‘secure market access’ is of some interest.  
 
To quantify these gains we use as a benchmark a bilateral US-Australia trade war 
which is unanticipated and lasts for five years. Note that it is assumed Australia retaliates 
reciprocally against the US with all tariffs going up to the 10 percent level. The ROW is 
not involved in any way. These results are presented in Table 7. Per capita GDP gains are 
about one half of a percent by the end of the trade war in year 5. It can be seen that 
cumulative GDP gains from trade war avoidance are just over 2 percent by year 5. One 
can also see the substantial cost of a trade war with the US, in the trade volume figures. 
Overall trade with the US falls by 30 percent relative to an AUSFTA benchmark, and, 
interestingly, AUS-ROW trade only increases by less than one percent. 
 
6. Conclusion 
  In this paper we have used a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model of Australia-US-
Rest-of-World trade to examine the potential impact of the Australia-US Free Trade 
Agreement. The model incorporates a detailed treatment of three types of physical capital 
accumulation, as well as the dynamics of investment and accumulation of human capital. 
The paper first re-examined the impacts of tariff reduction and dynamic add-on effects 
which follow for total factor productivity gains and cost of capital reductions which 
might follow from the agreement. Broadly speaking the results of the model confirm 
what has been found in other CGE analysis of the agreement, with total gains from all 
three sources amounting to a gain in per capita GDP of about half a percent after ten 
years and a steady-state gain of about one percent. These gains, however, stem largely 
from the presumed dynamic effects. The effects of tariff reduction are very modest 16 
amount to a gain of about 2/10
th of one percent of steady-state GDP per capita. These 
results confirm the importance of modeling dynamic effects in looking at potential 
benefits to regional trade liberalization. 
  
The paper also provides new estimates on the ‘insurance benefits’ of Australian 
membership in the US trade bloc in the event of possible global trade wars. Trade wars 
were modeled as increases in tariffs of 10 percent from the base level against all non-
member countries. In this setting the FTA provides Australia market access at a time 
other markets are being shut. We found that, excluding any possible dynamic 
productivity or risk premia effects, the net insurance gains are substantial and much 
larger than the traditional status quo based efficiency gains. In the case of permanent 
global trade war the benefits of Australia to being in the US bloc amount to a one percent 
gain in GDP per capita, or a cumulative GDP gain of 30 percent of base GDP. In the case 
of a temporary trade war lasting five years GDP per capita is estimated to be about 0.5 
percent higher by the end of the trade war as consequence of being inside the US trade 
bloc. 
  
Lastly the paper looks at the possible insurance or commitment value of AUSFTA 
as a means of preventing future US protectionism targeted at Australia. Using a five year 
Australia-US trade war as the basis against which to evaluate the commitment/insurance 
benefits the net impact is a per capita GDP gain of about 0.5 per cent. The number is not 
large but is larger than the presumed static efficiency gains of the tariff reductions alone 
achieved by AUSFTA. Overall the paper suggests that the economic analysis of RTA’s is 
not complete without quantification of the insurance benefits of such agreements. The 
AUSFTA is typical of many of these agreements in that the static gains to the smaller 
partner are modest. However both the dynamic gains and market access insurance gains 
are much larger. 
 17 
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 AUSFTA Australia Impact-Trade Barrier Removal Only 
(percentage change relative to steady state benchmark) 
  1 year  5 years  10 years 
Steady 
State 
Welfare Indicators      
Real GDP per capita  0.06  0.11  0.15  0.20 
Real Consumption per capita  0.03  -0.06  -0.01  0.04 
      
Investment-Output ratios      
Machinery Investment to GDP  0.07  0.04  -0.02  -0.03 
Structures Investment to GDP  0.11  0.13  0.09  0.07 
Residential Investment to GDP  -0.09  -0.05  -0.07  -0.09 
Educational Output to GDP ratio  0.11  0.08  0.01  -0.09 
      
Real Factor Prices      
Machine  Rental  0.04 -0.05 -0.13 -0.15 
Structures  Rental  0.03 0.11 0.07 0.02 
Residential Rental  0.08  -0.01  0.04  0.03 
Skilled  wage  0.05 0.12 0.17 0.17 
Unskilled  wage  0.07 0.13 0.15 0.19 
Land  Rental  0.18 0.12 0.17 0.19 
Resource  Stock  Rental  -0.08 0.07 0.06 0.08 
Skilled-Unskilled  wage  ratio  -0.02 -0.01  0.02 -0.02 
      
Factor Endowment Indicators      
Machine Stock to real GDP ratio  -0.06  0.04  0.09  0.13 
Structures Stock to real GDP ratio  -0.06  -0.04  -0.01  0.05 
Machinery capital per Unskilled worker  0.01  0.17  0.26  0.38 
Structures capital per Unskilled worker  0.01  0.09  0.16  0.29 
Residential Housing Stock to GDP ratio   -0.06  -0.12  -0.13  -0.11 
Skilled to Unskilled Labour ratio  0.01  0.03  0.06  0.15 
      
Trade Indicators      
Real Exchange Rate  -0.12 -0.14 -0.16 -0.16 
Terms_of_Trade  -0.09 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 
Trade Volume US-Australia  5.10  5.43  5.83  6.08 
Trade Volume Australia-ROW  -0.18  -0.12  -0.10  -0.07 
Openness  Ratio  Australia  0.70 0.77 0.81 0.83 
Trade Surplus as percent of value of GDP 




AUSFTA Impact Australia: Trade Barrier Removal Only 
Sectoral Output Changes 
(percentage change relative to steady state benchmark) 
  1 year  5 years  10 years 
Steady 
State 
Agriculture  0.79 0.90 0.96 0.98 
Minerals -0.25  -0.06  -0.02  0.05 
Lowtech  Manufactures  -0.26 -0.21 -0.25 -0.24 
Intermediate  Manufactures  -0.17 0.06 0.07 0.11 
Durable  Manufactures  -1.00 -0.62 -0.57 -0.41 
Traded Services  -0.01  -0.01  0.03  0.09 
Construction  0.03 0.09 0.11 0.15 
Non  Traded  Services  0.02 0.01 0.05 0.10 
Public Sector  0.01  -0.01  0.02  0.07 
Housing  -0.05 -0.08 -0.06 -0.01 







Investment plus Productivity Gain 
Investment impact on Machinery and Structures Only (8 basis case) 
(percentage change relative to steady state benchmark) 
  1 year  5 years  10 years 
Steady 
State 
Welfare Indicators      
Real GDP per capita  0.01  0.24  0.52  0.93 
Real Consumption per capita  0.49  -0.24  0.08  0.60 
      
Investment-Output ratios      
Machinery Investment to GDP  -0.09  0.74  0.76  0.63 
Structures Investment to GDP  0.22  0.92  0.97  0.73 
Residential Investment to GDP  -0.27  0.15  0.03  -0.21 
Educational Output to GDP ratio  0.92  1.29  0.86  -0.07 
      
Real Factor Prices      
Machine Rental  -0.23  0.03  -0.40  -0.62 
Structures Rental  -0.27  0.17  -0.04  -0.52 
Residential  Rental  0.66 -0.27 -0.01 -0.02 
Skilled  wage  0.09 0.26 0.59 0.58 
Unskilled  wage  -0.05 0.3  0.45 0.75 
Land Rental  0.56  -0.11  0.09  0.34 
Resource  Stock  Rental  -0.64 0.25 0.30 0.45 
Skilled-Unskilled  wage  ratio  0.14 -0.05  0.14 -0.17 
      
Factor Endowment Indicators      
Machine Stock to real GDP ratio  -0.01  0.07  0.41  0.78 
Structures Stock to real GDP ratio  -0.01  0.03  0.27  0.77 
Machinery capital per Unskilled worker  0.04  0.43  1.12  2.15 
Structures capital per Unskilled worker  0.04  0.39  0.98  2.14 
Residential Housing Stock to GDP ratio   -0.01  -0.23  -0.38  -0.17 
Skilled to Unskilled Labour ratio  0.04  0.24  0.47  1.29 
      
Trade Indicators      
Real Exchange Rate  -0.17 -0.09 -0.16 -0.16 
Terms of Trade  -0.26  -0.06  -0.15  -0.24 
Trade Volume US-Australia  5.02  5.54  6.12  6.59 
Trade Volume Australia-ROW  -0.37  -0.01  0.18  0.44 
Openness  Ratio  Australia  0.44 0.78 0.67 0.51 
Trade Surplus as percent of value of GDP 




Investment plus Productivity Gain 
Investment impact on Machinery and Structures Only (8 basis case) 
Sectoral Output Changes 
(percentage change relative to steady state benchmark) 
  1 year  5 years  10 years 
Steady 
State 
Agriculture  0.65 0.72 0.85 0.98 
Minerals  -0.77 0.24 0.70 1.37 
Lowtech  Manufactures  -0.33 0.03 0.34 0.74 
Intermediate  Manufactures  -0.78 0.3  0.66 1.16 
Durable  Manufactures  -2.81 0.21 0.60 1.02 
Traded  Services  0.14 0.03 0.39 0.91 
Construction  0.05 0.51 0.85 1.18 
Non  Traded  Services  0.23 0.00 0.32 0.77 
Public  Sector  0.11 0.02 0.24 0.70 
Housing 0.07  -0.04  0.17  0.65 





Value of AUSFTA in Event of a 
Global Trade War Starting Year 11 
(percentage change with AUSFTA relative to trade war scenario) 
  1 year  5 years  10 years 
Steady 
State 
Welfare Indicators      
Real GDP per capita  0.02  0.15  0.29  1.02 
Real Consumption per capita  0.36  -0.20  -0.12  0.37 
Cumulative GDP gains as percent of base 
GDP  0.02 0.42 1.49  35.65 
      
Investment-Output ratios      
Machinery Investment to GDP  -0.05  0.36  0.59  -0.09 
Structures Investment to GDP  0.19  0.62  0.96  0.24 
Residential Investment to GDP  -0.22  0.16  0.48  -0.41 
Educational Output to GDP ratio  0.81  1.26  1.56  -0.36 
      
Real Factor Prices      
Machine Rental  -0.15  -0.02  -0.2  -0.67 
Structures  Rental  -0.19 0.08  -0.09 0.10 
Residential Rental  0.51  -0.21  -0.25  0.11 
Skilled  wage  0.07 0.12 0.22 0.85 
Unskilled  wage  -0.02 0.23 0.34 0.96 
Land Rental  0.46  -0.04  -0.02  0.69 
Resource  Stock  Rental  -0.48 0.17 0.20 0.38 
Skilled-Unskilled  wage  ratio  0.09 -0.10 -0.13 -0.11 
      
Factor Endowment  Indicators      
Machine Stock to real GDP ratio  -0.02  0.07  0.26  0.61 
Structures Stock to  real GDP ratio  -0.02  0.04  0.24  0.16 
Machinery capital per Unskilled worker  0.04  0.32  0.74  1.94 
Structures capital per Unskilled worker  0.04  0.29  0.71  1.49 
Residential Housing Stock to GDP ratio   -0.02  -0.15  -0.15  -0.50 
Skilled to Unskilled Labour ratio  0.04  0.20  0.45  0.95 
      
Trade Indicators      
Real Exchange Rate  -0.16 -0.10 -0.12 -0.72 
Terms of Trade  -0.21  -0.04  -0.1  -0.25 
Trade Volume US-Australia  5.05  5.45  5.94  31.57 
Trade Volume Australia-ROW  -0.33  -0.08  0.00  -0.40 
Openness  Ratio  Australia  0.50 0.79 0.77 4.83 
Trade Surplus as percent of value of GDP 





Temporary Global Trade War Years 1-5 
Impact of AUSFTA relative to being outside both Blocs 
  Year 1  Year 5  Year 10 
Welfare indicators     
Real GDP per capita  0.39  0.52  0.15 
Real Consumption per capita  -0.05  0.06  0.03 
Cumulative GDP gains as percent of base GDP  0.39  2.23  2.69 
     
Real Factor Prices     
Machine Rental  0.44  -0.19  -0.34 
Structures Rental  0.35  0.59  0.09 
Residential Rental  0.08  0.35  0.14 
Skilled wage  0.41  0.68  0.28 
Unskilled wage  0.47  0.5  0.12 
Land Rental  0.39  0.62  0.23 
Resource Stock Rental  0.06  0.21  0.03 
Skilled-Unskilled wage ratio  -0.06  0.18  0.15 
     
Trade Indicators     
Real Exchange Rate -0.55  -0.70  -0.20 
Terms of Trade  -0.22  -0.14  -0.07 
Trade Volume US-Australia  29.89  30.44  5.83 
Trade Volume Australia-ROW  -0.81  -0.70  -0.10 




US-Australia Bilateral Temporary Trade War Scenario 
AUSFTA relative to Bilateral Trade War Years 1-5  
  Year 1  Year 5  Year 10 
Welfare indicators       
Real GDP per capita  0.37  0.5  0.15 
Real Consumption per capita  -0.03  0.05  0.05 
Cumulative GDP gains as percent of base GDP  0.37  2.11  2.65 
     
Real Factor Prices     
Machine Rental  0.43  -0.21  -0.33 
Structures Rental  0.28  0.52  0.08 
Residential Rental  0.13  0.3  0.13 
Skilled wage  0.38  0.67  0.27 
Unskilled wage  0.45  0.5  0.13 
Land Rental  0.49  0.65  0.24 
Resource Stock Rental  -0.07  0.09  0.02 
Skilled-Unskilled wage ratio  -0.07  0.16  0.14 
     
Trade Indicators     
Real Exchange Rate -0.54  -0.68  -0.20 
Terms of Trade  -0.16  -0.10  -0.07 
Trade Volume US-Australia  29.81  30.24  5.83 
Trade Volume Australia-ROW  -0.79  -0.68  -0.10 
Openness Ratio Australia  3.43  3.40  0.77 
 